



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

enjoin the unconscionable use of a legal right. *Clement v. Wheeler*, 25 N. H. 361. Thus where the corporate device is employed to do something which the shareholders could not do, courts may disregard the fiction that the corporation is an independent person, and enjoin the continuance of such action. *United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co.*, 142 Fed. 247; *Northern Securities Co. v. United States*, 193 U. S. 197. In the principal case, upon disregarding the corporate fiction of the coal company it appears that in substance the defendant is transporting its own goods.

CORPORATIONS — TORTS AND CRIMES — LIABILITY FOR SLANDER OF AGENT. — The plaintiff in his declaration alleged, in substance, that an agent of the defendant corporation, in the course of his business, slandered the plaintiff, but he did not allege that the defendant authorized the slander. *Held*, that the declaration discloses no cause of action. *Jackson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.*, 69 S. E. 919 (Ga.).

There is a conflict of authority on the question whether any principal is liable for the slander of his agent, not authorized by him. See 23 HARV. L. REV. 304. And where the principal is a corporation, some cases deny its liability on the ground that it has not the capacity to commit this particular tort. See *Behre v. National Cash Register Co.*, 100 Ga. 213, 214. But, it is submitted, there is no sound reason why a corporation should not be held; and some authorities take this view. See *Empire Cream Separator Co. v. De Laval Dairy Supply Co.*, 75 N. J. L. 207.

ELECTIONS — CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMON PROVISIONS IN PRIMARY ELECTION ACTS. — A statute provided that unless the aggregate vote cast for all candidates for nomination on a party ballot for one office should equal twenty per cent of the vote cast by that party for governor at the last general election, such party should not have a party nominee for that office on the official ballot. *Held*, that the act is constitutional. *State ex rel. McGrael v. Phelps*, 128 N. W. 1041 (Wis.).

A statute provided that unless the aggregate vote cast for all candidates for a particular office at the primary should equal thirty per cent of the number of votes cast by that party for secretary of state at the last general election, no nomination should be made by that party for such office. *Held*, that the act is unconstitutional. *State ex rel. Dorval v. Hamilton*, 129 N. W. 916 (N. D.). See NOTES, p. 659.

ELECTIONS — ELECTION CONTEST — DISCONTINUANCE OF SUIT. — A statute provided that an election might be contested by any thirty voters who should file a petition in the Supreme Court. A petition signed by thirty-one voters was filed, but, before issue joined, two petitioners moved to discontinue the suit as to them. A motion to amend by adding other petitioners was denied, and the suit dismissed. *Held*, that the court lost jurisdiction of the cause by the withdrawal of the two petitioners, and the suit was properly dismissed. *Bright v. Fern*, 20 Haw. 325.

The result reached here is at variance with the few authorities that bear on the question involved. It is generally held that an election contest is not an adversary proceeding, but a matter in the outcome of which the public has an interest. *Minor v. Kidder*, 43 Cal. 229; *Coppock v. Bower*, 4 M. & W. 361. See McCrARY, ELECTIONS, § 454. This view is most reasonable, as the statutory remedy has been held to supersede the common-law proceeding of *quo warranto*. *Parks v. State*, 100 Ala. 634; *Commonwealth v. Leech*, 44 Pa. St. 332. The right of the remaining petitioners to continue the contest is supported by two lines of reasoning. The first class of cases holds that jurisdiction of the cause attaches at the filing of the petition and is not ousted by the subsequent